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This short text is the second in a series of articles from the 
recently established “Bio-Objects” research network sup-
ported  by  the  European  Commission’s  Cooperation  in 
Science and Technology (COST) program (1). Here we ex-
plore in more detail the ways in which we understand the 
boundaries of bio-objects determined through a “bio-ob-
jectification” process wherein life-forms or living entities are 
first made into objects, become possible, through scientif-
ic labor and its associated technologies, and then come to 
be attributed with specific identities. This move from living 
entity, through bio-objectification to what we can call “bio-
identification” helps us to understand the contested, often 
controversial process seen in the biological sciences (and 
not merely in biomedicine, but elsewhere, such as in agri-
culture and food research) where we see a new mixture of 
relations to life or to which “life” is attributed, such as ani-
mal-human hybrids, chimera, genetically modified organ-
isms, or transgenics. As a consequence of these novel rela-
tions, the boundaries between human and animal, organic 
and nonorganic, living and the suspension of living (and 
the meaning of death itself), are often questioned and de-
stabilized, and their identities have to be negotiated and 
(temporarily) stabilized, and so given an identity. What is 
common to what we call bio-objects, is that they all in var-
ious ways challenge conventional cultural, scientific, and 
institutional orderings and classifications.
One obvious boundary to address is the one between hu-
mans and other animals. Bio-medical innovations such as 
transgenic and cloned animals, or hybrid embryos, trans-
gress species boundaries that we like to think of as given 
by nature. These novel bio-objects potentially point out 
that the natural order is rather a social one, or perhaps 
better, a bio-social one. However, this potentiality is 
not often realized. These objects, when traveling through 
various regulatory bodies in society, including the bio-eth-
ical sphere, are treated as special cases that rather confirm, 
than move, species boundaries. For example, from the Eu-
ropean Chimbrids project, which dealt with the ethical and 
legal regulations of various forms of species mixes, it be-
comes clear that these mixes re-instate the discourse of hu-
man superiority, as markers of “human-ness” are constantly 
being emphasized (for example brain size, language, ratio-
nality, and genomic distinctions).
A second example that is of interest is the living/non-living 
boundary. Novel bio-objects often challenge or transgress 
what we conventionally refer to as a clear line between liv-
ing and non-living. For example when it comes to human 
fetuses in research and bio-medical practice – whether it 
concerns embryonic stem cells or genetic preimplantation 
testing  in  in-vitro  fertilization,  the  boundaries  between 
what is considered a living organism are negotiated in clin-
ical practice, laboratories, media, and regulatory bodies. 
The boundaries also shift depending on the context, thus 
implying that we are dealing with different bio-objects. In 
Sweden, the limit is set at 14 days for embryonic research, 
and 18 weeks for abortion. While the first limit has been 
debated lately in relation to stem cell research, the latter is 
not open for debate. The arbitrariness of living/non-living 
boundaries points at many interesting and highly political 
openings.
These examples of dynamic processes suggest that there is 
no once-and-for-all list of bio-objects, a sort of bio-object 
catalog or portfolio, made up of life forms that have spe-
cific properties or essential characteristics that make them 
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position that bio-objects are created in and through devel-
opments in science that leads to debate over the meaning 
of life and that make life matter. It need not, therefore, be 
the novel materiality of life that itself kick-starts the bio-
objectifying process.
From a research point of view, this suggests we need to 
identify different arenas or locations where bio-objectifica-
tion is to be found – eg, in controversial clinical trials (such 
as the Geron stem cells trial), contested diagnostics (typi-
cally within the field of genomics or imaging), or the do-
main of reproduction (such as in debates over the bound-
aries between viable and non-viable life) – and how the 
boundaries of life and emergent bio-identities are enacted 
within these arenas. This also raises the more challenging 
question of whether traffic between different sites trans-
lates  and  transforms  the  bio-objectification  process.  A 
bio-object, associated with, say, biomedical research, may 
subsequently find its way into the food system or the en-
vironment, or become part of a repository and new me-
dium of technical innovation (to be stored in biobanks or 
cord blood banks), and have multiple or even contrasting 
cultural meanings as it circulates between different sec-
tors or networks of society. At the same time, new regula-
tory boundaries are developed for which human and non-
human material can and cannot be legitimately traded as 
bio-objects (for example, oocytes and embryos).
It should be clear from what we have said that the con-
cept of bio-objectification is much richer than concepts 
found elsewhere in the social science literature such as the 
“molecularization” of life, which claims that biological life is 
now understood through molecular biology and genetics. 
Rather, we seek to explore the articulation of this process, 
and other science-based constructions of life. It should be 
stressed that bio-objectification processes are not linear or 
have a specific path-dependency. Bio-objectification can 
start  at  one  point,  go  through  institutional  transforma-
tions, come to a halt or be silenced, and then revitalized at 
a later point. This means that bio-objectification explicitly 
includes consideration of organizational and institutional 
processes and the ways in which the governance of bio-
objects can bring closure and stability to them, but which 
is always likely to leave open the possibility of new contes-
tation and debate in the future, and, of course, across dif-
ferent countries, even at the same time.
We argued above that bio-objects are in principle, contest-
ed socio-technical objects. But they depend on the exis-
tence and manipulation of living entities that have some 
coherent biological form and agency. This does not mean 
that the biological entities are “naked” or completely plastic 
before they become subject to the bio-objectification pro-
cess. There are some biomaterial “affordances” to the enti-
ties that limit their variability and use and forms and de-
grees of manipulation and control exercised over them by 
bioscience itself. Science seeks to stabilize and classify and 
deploy bio-objects in novel ways, but this can be extreme-
ly difficult, as we have seen in recent years in attempts to 
standardize and control the use of embryonic stem cells in 
cell therapies.
As  manipulated  bio-objects  appear,  precisely  because 
they are characterized as constructed, as having a hybrid-
ity involving the manipulation and capture of biological 
forms and processes, with no “intrinsic” self or boundary as 
such, they often evoke the language of the “unnatural” or, 
in some way, being disconnected from “the normal.” This 
reminds us of the work of the social anthropologist Mary 
Douglas, who wrote about “matter out of place” – cultural 
and material forms that do not fit into existing taxonomies, 
threaten order, and because of this, need to be brought un-
der some sort of control. They are thus dealt with through 
various neutralizing strategies. At the same time, not of-
ten acknowledged in Douglas’ work, these unruly objects 
are ambiguous in their effects, they do not only constitute 
threats, but can also provide a positive force. Consequent-
ly, such “monsters” need to be reined in through regulatory 
“heroes,” whose task is to tame the unruly object, or at least 
to provide stabilizing mechanisms – within the political 
arena these might be various forms of deliberative debate/
consensus conferences and regulations – that establish 
the terms on which engagement with the hybrid monster 
– the genetically modified organism, the xenotransplant 
etc – is to be undertaken. This process also helps to pro-
vide a framework through which markets for bio-objects 
become possible, and indeed promoted, as we see in the 
expectations (often overstated) surrounding the growth of 
regenerative medicine. In addition, we see a range of scien-
tific, regulatory, and legal provisions and conventions ap-
pear, such as the determination of species boundaries, the 
ethical rights and obligations of the bio-object and those 
using it, and diverse provisions associated with claims to 
ownership of property (including property of a body).
Bio-objects are then about material life that changes the 
meaning of life and gives it new trajectories through the 
resolution  process  associated  with  bio-objectification 
and thereafter bio-identification. But we can identify 
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fully encompassed by this concept, yet which is often im-
portant in defining and making mobile (both geographi-
cally  and  scientifically  across  different  areas  of  inquiry) 
bio-objects themselves. We can call this the domain of the 
“bio-virtual,” a specific form of life which exists as informa-
tion, data and informational flows that mobilizes bio-ob-
jects through data networks as a form of aggregative life. 
These different forms of vitality are summarized in Table 1.
Moreover, we outline below how our three related dimen-
sions of biological entities, bio-objects, and the bio-virtual 
come together (Figure 1). The substantive and method-
ological focus for our work in the COST Action will be on 
the ways these relate as in the diagram below, crucially in 
the processes of bio-objectification and bio-identification 
found in the center of the diagram.
The main methodological implications of the argument 
thus far are 3-fold – we need to engage in:
• Mapping and tracking: follow the bio-object as it engages 
(circulates across) current legal provisions and regulation – 
understanding the bio-objectification process and its dif-
ferent dimensions
•  Comparing:  determining  the  divergences  and  conver-
gences of bio-objects/objectification across different do-
mains
• Modeling: identifying stabilizing (shape-holding) and dis-
ruptive patterns and processes associated with bio-objec-
tification
The COST Action will draw on members’ substantive re-
search  interests  to  undertake  these  three  overlapping 
tasks.
To summarize, the concept of bio-object stresses the point 
that boundaries around “the living” are not stable and that 
there is what we may call a potential openness in processes 
of bio-objectification and bio-identification through which 
such boundaries are drawn. In other words, it is not given 
what will count as categories of life, such as human or ani-
mal, viable life or non viable life, biological or social. Where 
the boundaries get drawn and what meaning categories 
get assigned to, are crucial in terms of knowledge produc-
tion, bio-political interventions and regulations, and every-
day lives in a more-than-human world. When, where, how, 
and with what results such boundaries are made and ne-
gotiated, are interesting and politically charged questions 
to ask.
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